Fire safety engineering is introduced in the forensic context, and responsibilities of various actors operating for fire safety in buildings are defined in relation to the different available fire safety strategies. The responsibility of the designers concerning the structural behaviour is highlighted with specific reference to the requirement of structural robustness in high-rise buildings. In case of complex structures, the robustness assessment can be made by the avail of advanced structural numerical analyses, which are nowadays the most reliable tools for understanding, governing and addressing this kind of problems. In addition, the same importance is given to the numerical analyses in case where these are used in forensic investigation for obtaining a back-assessment of the occurred fire-induced collapse in tall buildings. The complexity of the problem, the correct approach to this kind of analyses and the correct interpretation of the obtained results are discussed with reference to a high-rise steel building.
Introduction

Overview of fire safety engineering and its forensic implications
Fire safety engineering concerns the application of scientific and engineering principles to the effects of the fire on buildings and structures in order to avoid the loss of life and reduce damage to properties by quantifying the risks and hazards involved and provide an optimal solution to the application of preventive or protective measures (Purkiss, 2007) . Fire safety is a rapidly expanding multi-disciplinary research topic. It requires the integration of many different fields of science and engineering (Buchanan, 2001) .
Structural integrity of buildings and safety of people in urban areas have been often endangered in the past by malevolent or accidental fires. Fires cause many hundreds of deaths and millions of dollars of property loss each year (Hall, 2011) . Unfortunately, fires can occur in almost any kind of building, often when least expected. The safety of the occupants depends on many factors in the design and construction of buildings, including the expectation that certain buildings and parts of buildings will not collapse in a fire or allow the fire to spread (Buchanan, 2001) .
The objectives of the fire safety strategies are to limit to acceptable levels the probability of death, injury and property loss. The lack of efficiency in fire safety engineering procedures is often the subject of forensic back analyses for responsibility assessment. As outlined below, due to the strong structural engineering content of the performances of buildings under fire, the reproduction of some occurred structural behaviour under fire by advances numerical simulations is a crucial part of the forensic engineer job after a fire-related event.
In order to contrast an exceptional action as fire, different safety strategies are possible and each one can be related to the legal responsibility of different actors of the buildings life-cycle:
(a) Prevention (responsibility of owners and managers). Implemented to reduce the probability that the action occurs or reduce its intensity, implementing specific measures of event control, such as forbidding smoke and storage of combustible material in premises, shutting down electric equipment during the night or when the premises are not used, etc. It concerns the limitation of ignition sources, the training and information of staff and customers and the compliance with specific regulation on systems;
(b) Fire active protection measures (responsibility of designers and maintainers). Implemented to reduce the effects of the action on the structure e.g. by installing a sprinkler system or by changing the properties of the fire compartment, so that the fire will be milder or shorter; these measures are active (all the measures that are taken in order to obtain extinguish fire during its initial phase). Active protective measures include both the use of technological systems, such as automatic detection systems, alarm systems, smoke, ordinary extinguishing systems (hydrants and fire extinguishers), automatic extinguishing systems (sprinklers) and the adoption of decisions planning and appropriate organisational planning that makes it quick and safe evacuation of the building and the timely intervention of rescue teams;
(c) Structural fire passive protection measures (responsibility of designers for local structural behaviours). Implemented to avoid or reduce the damages that may be caused on the structural system by the fire, by insulating the elements or by increasing the dimension or the mechanical properties of their section or material resistance. These measures are passive (the set of measures that are taken in order to minimise damage building during fire generalised);
(d) Structural robustness to fire (responsibility of designers for global structural behaviours). Required to reduce the effects of a local damage, by reducing the susceptibility of the structure to progressive collapse (mitigation); it allows the development of local crises and proportional to the intensity of the fire (Fang et al., 2011) .
While the strategies (a) and (b) are based on non-structural measures, the strategies (c) and (d) are structural techniques. Structural robustness is important for avoiding fire-induced large socio-economic consequences involving different actors. The structural global collapse of buildings due to the lack of robustness is an event able to enlarge the scale of fire-induced consequences, making able losses to switch from regarding building envelope-confined goods and people to involving the built-and social-environment external to the collapsed building (e.g. for material debris or sideway collapses).
In addition, whereas other fire-safety strategies described above (a, b, c) can be implemented by prescriptive approaches (the building standards clearly states the measures and implementation methodologies to pursue in order to indirectly obtain the goal) or without the development of advanced numerical analyses (e.g. the structural fire passive protection measures can be designed on an element-to-element basis), the structural robustness can be obtained in an economic way by the designer only by the implementation of advanced, complex numerical models able to take into account the changing non-linear behaviour of structures during fire on a global building scale. In fact disproportionate damages induced by fire can be avoided with a proper design of the structure, aimed at reducing the vulnerability of the elements to fire (i.e. their sensitivity to fire) or at increasing the robustness of the structural system (i.e. its sensitivity to local damages) (Giuliani, 2012) . The modern structural designer is then required, especially for the design of complex structural systems (Petrini et al., 2010) to deeply understand and correctly use, the advanced tools (numerical codes) used in fire structural analyses for robustness assessment, this is a crucial aspect for preventing themselves from penal allocation of responsibility in a court.
Fire in tall buildings
In addition to the unacceptable aspects related to the collapse of structures, tall buildings generally are considered iconic because they are unusual in height and design. Also for this reason, the loss of these structures is not acceptable by the society Three different aspects can affect design of both non-structural and structural measures for fire safety in tall buildings:
 evacuation of the building;  fire spread;  structural robustness (the structural behaviour in terms of susceptibility of the building to disproportionate collapse).
Figure 1 summarises the above-mentioned specific issues and safety measures for the design of tall buildings against fire, taking into account two main goals:
 save people, avoiding injuries and casualties;
 save property, avoiding damages and inoperability. 
Design
On the right side of Figure 1 , the main responsibility in a forensic analysis context concerning the specific issues and measures is also identified, coherently to the general consideration of the previous section. As stated above, the provision of structural robustness is a primary responsibility of the structural designer, and need to be addressed by conducting advanced numerical analyses as shown in following sections.
In relation to the first aspect, it should be considered that time necessary for full building evacuation increases with building height. The human behaviour is one of the most significant issues to consider (Proulx, 2008; Bryan, 2008) . The egress system design requires some form of engineering analysis to be conducted to determine the time taken to evacuate the building under different scenarios. The analysis typically compares a Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) versus the Available Safe Egress Time (ASET) (SFPE, 2003) . The correct design of escape routes and of the detection system is crucial in obtaining an acceptable RSET.
The fire spread need to be monitored with appropriate alert systems. The compartmentation is traditionally the primary way to control the fire spread, the presence of large compartments is often required in tall buildings and is nowadays also a desired characteristic of many offices and residential premises as well. Finally, the suppression system can be efficient in the first phase of fire spread, and it is often non reliable in case of tall buildings, due to the fact that the water supply needs in tall buildings can be beyond water supply capability of public mains and fire department pumpers (SFPE, 2012) .
Regarding structural robustness, it is important to understand that the ratio of strength and stiffness of adjacent elements can influence the progressive collapse susceptibility of the system (Gentili et al., 2013) . In addition to the importance of the fire compartmentation to limit the hot zone of the building, a specific consideration concerning the propagation of failures is that a particularly dangerous situation is represented by a possible spread of failures to elements not directly involved in the fire, i.e. element that due to their location or because of greater insulation have still a relatively low temperature at the time of failure (Usmani et al., 2003) .
The analysis of cases of WTC and Windsor Tower, above briefly mentioned, allows assessing the role of the structural organisation in countering extreme events such as fire.
In WTC case, there were four major structural subsystems in the towers, referred to as the exterior wall, the core, the floor system and the hat truss (NIST NCSTAR 1, 2005) . The latter, formed by a set of steel braces, was located from 107th floor to the roof of each tower. The initial buckling of the heated floor slabs induced by hindered thermal expansion would have subsequently caused the buckling of the columns, as a consequence of the loss of horizontal restrains of the floors.
The Windsor Tower was a 32-storey concrete office building with a reinforced concrete core and a height of 106 m. The structure had two technical floors without windows in the middle. It was believed that the multiple floor fire, along with the simultaneous buckling of the unprotected steel perimeter columns at several floors, triggered the collapse of the floor slabs above the 17th floor (Craighead, 2009) , (Fletcher et al., 2006) . It seems that collapse of first horizontal slab, impacting on the slab below, causes its failure in turn. The portion of the building that collapsed consisted of the outer portions of floor slabs and perimeter walls throughout the upper third of the building (the 21st through 32nd floors). After the fire, the building was demolished.
In both structures the outrigger has played a central role in the development of collapse. In general, outriggers serve to reduce the overturning moment in the core that would otherwise act as pure cantilever, and to transfer the reduced moment to the outer columns through the outriggers connecting the core to these columns (Ali and Moon, 2007; Taranath, 1998) . In WTC with the impact damage, the core subsystem leaned to the southeast and was supported by the south and east perimeter walls via hat truss and floors. As the core weakened, it redistributed loads to the perimeter walls through the hat truss and floors (Isobe et al., 2012) . In Windsor Tower, the pancake-type progressive collapse (NILIM, 2005) seems to have come to a halt in correspondence of two technical floors, which represented a localised stiffening of the system.
In this paper, a steel high rise building is taken as case study and the response of the building is investigated up to the crisis of the structure with respect to a standard fire. The main goal of the paper is to highlight the role played by vertical braced systems and by outriggers in the fire induced collapse mechanisms and in a possible propagation of the initial failures to zones of the structure not directly involved in the fire.
To this purpose, simplified fire design and verification methods on isolated elements are not sufficient and the response of the structural system as a whole (Usmani, et al., 2000) has to be investigated. This is a quite difficult task, which in case of complex structures such as a high rise building (Research Fund for Coal and Steel of the European Community, 2008; Olmati el al, 2013; Petrini, 2013; Rein et al 2007) , necessarily requires some simplifying assumptions in the modelling of the action and of the structure. The paper specifically points out on last aspect (behaviour of the structure as whole).
The main goal of the paper is to drive the attention on the responsibility of the structural Designers regarding robustness, and to highlight the critical role of the numerical analyses as principal tool for governing the structural behaviours related to the progressive collapse of tall buildings.
Case study
Description of the building
The building considered as case study is a 40-storey framed steel tall building, whose premises are devoted to offices and residential use ( Figure 2) . A vertical bracing system provides stiffness against horizontal actions, while no horizontal bracing system is present within the floor planes, since the bidirectional concrete floor slabs provides the necessary in-plane stiffness. The inclusion of hollow spheres in the concrete floor slab, together with the biaxial symmetry of the slabs (Giuliani and Gentili, 2015) , allowed for the presence of beams with relatively small profiles spanning long distances.
On the contrary, the sections of the columns are quite big, as the resistance against horizontal loads is totally entrusted to the columns. As a result, the difference in the section dimensions of the horizontal and vertical elements is quite high in this type of structural system and becomes particularly significant in the bottom floors, where the column sections are the biggest. This characteristic may influence the structural response in case of fire, as highlighted in Gentili et al. (2013) . Member sizes are depicted in Table 1 (for columns), Table 2 (for braces) and Table 3 (for beams). Table 1 Sizing columns 1, 7, 54, 60 2, 3, 5, 6, 14, 22, 23, 24 29, 30, 31, 32 37, 38, 39, 47 55, 56, 58, 59 17, 18, 19, 26 27, 34, 35, 42 4, 8, 13, 48 53, 57 9, 12, 15, 16, 20, 21, 25, 28, 33, 36, 40, 41, 45, 46, 49, 52 10, 11, 50, 51 Height The structure has an outrigger at 29th floor which position is highlighted on bottom left of Figure 2 . On top left Figure 2 shows position of vertical braces. Rigid full-strength joints (with stiffened end-plate) are considered. For illustration, Figure 3 depicts the Node 1 between beam95, beam91, beam101, a vertical brace and column1 at first floor. 
Elements
Mechanical and thermal actions for structural analysis
The building has been designed in compliance with the load combination (equation 1) for the Ultimate Limit States (ULS), where wind, earthquake, snow and service loads have been considered as variable actions (EN 1990 (EN , 2002 . The coefficients for permanent and live loads are compliant to those indicated in the Italian regulations: in particular, the most severe combination for the dimensioning of the columns is the one where wind is considered as leading variable action and in this case a safety factor  Q1 = 1.5 is foreseen by the code (NTC, 2008) .
where symbols have the following meaning:
G 1 permanent loads of all structural elements G 2 permanent loads of all non-structural elements P pre-stressing loads Q k1 characteristic value of the leading variable action Q ki characteristic value of the accompanying variable action γ G1 partial safety factor for structural permanent loads γ G2 partial safety factor for non-structural permanent loads γ Qi partial safety factor for live loads ψ 0i combination factor for the rare value of actions.
Weight of slab (7.14 kN/m 2 ), permanent loads of non-structural elements (7.14 kN/m 2 ) and variable actions for non-public offices (2 kN/m 2 ) are considered. The area where the building is placed is characterised by a class of roughness "B" (urban and sub-urban areas) and a class of exposition to wind "IV" (with a wind reference average 10 minute speed of 27 m/s). The seismic zone corresponds to a class II seismic level .
In order to take into account fire action, the mechanical actions have been combined in accordance with EN1990 for accidental design situations (equation 2). This results in neglecting the presence of wind for fire design, since the coefficient ψ 2i associated to the wind action is 0 in the above mentioned code where the fire action is considered.
where A d exceptional action ψ 2i combination factor for the almost permanent value of actions.
In tall buildings, the definition of an appropriate fire model could be based on a Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) techniques , or on experimental activities or codes (ISO 834-1:1999 (ISO 834-1: , 1975 . A nominal fire has been assumed in the form of the standard ISO 834 curve. The heating curves of steel members have been calculated under the assumption of uniform temperature along the sections, according to the Eurocode formula for the heating of unprotected steel profiles (EN 1993 (EN -1-2, 2005 . In the context of forensic investigations, this assumption should be verified, since cases where the protecting measures (e.g. tumescent painting) are applied to some structural members can be the most critical for collapse.
Structural modelling activity
As stated above, the correct modelling of the structural system and of the nonlinear mechanical behaviours is a fundamental task for the designer, especially in the forensic engineering context, where the design choices and/or the back (post-event) assessments about robustness mainly rely on the numerical results. A commercial finite element code has been used for the investigations (Simulia, 2014) , which takes into account thermoplastic material and geometric nonlinearities. The numerical code used in analyses is another crucial aspect that is not regulated in forensic studies: where significant nonlinearities are present, different structural codes can conduct to different results. The correct way to address this aspect is to approach the analysis starting with simplified models of the complex system representing the tall building, in order to understand the fundamental mechanisms determining the global behaviour (e.g. influence of the presence and the position of the outrigger). One of the best ways to approach the analysis phase of such a complex systems is to model some relevant substructures having main roles in the global structural behaviour. In this paper investigations are then first carried out on substructures: 3D model of the two principal vertical frames of the building, where all the floors are represented and vertical propagation of the damages can be evidenced. The investigations take into account a full nonlinear response of the structure, influenced by material degradation at high temperatures, possibility of buckling, large displacements and deformations and exploitation of plastic reserve of the elements.
Sectional models (about 22000 D.O.F.) allow the qualitative description of the structural behaviour of the building, in a simplified and rational way. In order to simulate the presence of beams perpendicular to the frame, transversal restraints have been applied to the sectional model in the 3rd dimension. On the right side of Figure 2 , the two substructures studied are shown. In particular frame A is constituted by two lateral vertical bracing systems, while frame B has a central core constituted by a vertical bracing and a part of the outrigger. A three-dimensional spatial full model (about 130000 D.O.F.), capable of highlighting vertical progression of the collapse and spatial resisting mechanisms, has been used for the qualitative assessment of the overall performance of the building. The models have been implemented by using beam elements. For the modelling and design of the frames, all beams are fully restrained at their ends with columns, while braces are assumed pinned. Some preliminary analyses were carried out in order to assess the joint behaviour (see Figure 4 ). All models are capable of highlighting possible out of plane displacements of the elements.
Slab weight, dead and live loads have been applied as line loads along the axis of the beams and considered together with the self-weight in a first load step. In a second load step the heating curves calculated for the steel profiles have been applied to the nodes of the elements pertinent to the area of the considered fire scenario, while other elements have been assumed to be not heated throughout the investigation. This kind of scenario, where two adjacent elements can be considered at different temperatures is typical of cases where the two belong to two different compartments. An explicit dynamic solver has been used in order to overcome convergence problems due to the formation of local mechanisms, thus enabling to trace down the propagation of failures. The analyses carried out allow studying the evolution of the collapse, but they do not provide any information on the effect of the impact of the elements failed elements on the remaining part of the structure.
Performance analysis
The investigations carried out in forensic context have the main goal to reproduce a certain occurred failure to identify the scenario (fire and structural conditions) that caused it, by a back analysis procedure. In order to reach this goal, three basic steps need to be performed:
 identify the time and type of failures;
 understand the main resistance mechanism;
 outline a possible propagation of the collapse (Milana et al., 2015) .
In consideration of the aim of these analyses, two different level of collapse can be identified:
 a local collapse of a single element occurs for the runaway of a significant point (Usmani et al., 2003) or for achieving of critical conditions of stress (buckling or yielding);
 a global collapse of the structure occurs for a vertical or lateral greater displacements of almost a point of the top of structure greater than a meter.
According to Starossek (2009) , a progressive collapse refers to a phenomenon where the collapse begins with the failure of one or a few structural components and then progresses over successive other components. While robustness is defined as insensitivity to local failure, collapse resistance can be defined as insensitivity to accidental circumstances, that is, to unforeseeable and Low-Probability -High-Consequence (LPHC) events (Sgambi, 2012) . In this sense, the investigation about the extension and length of a fire can be of interest: in this way it is possible to highlight possible deficiencies and weaknesses of the structural system in order to improve and optimise it or in order to perform a back calculation in forensic engineering contexts. In what follows, an example of structural analysis for evaluating robustness performances is shown. The complexity of the considered structural system and the strong non-linearity of the involved scenarios, clearly suggest the designers to be very careful in making design assumptions and fire simulations, especially if they are part of the analysis for progressive collapse assessment. In order to evaluate the progressive collapse susceptibility of the structure different fires with increasing extension were taken into account in frames A and B.
Analysis on sectional models
Frame A
It is assumed that the thermal action involves Frame A at sixth floor (top of Figure 5 ). At this height, design includes as profiles for columns HEM1000star (Col.25 and Col.28) and HEM900star (Col.23, Col.24, Col.26, Col.27, Col.29 and Col.30 In the first analysis, the thermal load is applied only on a column of the floor and on adjacent beams. This operation was repeated for each column of the sixth floor. In each of eight cases studied, a local crisis of the column occurs for approximately the same temperature and the same time. Figure 5 shows the behaviour of column for the case of fire on Col. 25 (HEM1000star) and Beam 43 (HEA240) and Beam 44 (HEA260) at sixth floor: the heated elements on the top, the axial force on the bottom left and the profile temperature on the bottom right. The axial force (red line on the left) has a value quite low at the beginning of the thermal load application. This quite low load-resistance ratio is due to load combination considered. In addition, the stress does not grow significantly with temperature because the thermal expansion is not completely avoided. The crisis occurs when red line reaches blue line in correspondence of about 696°C after 30 minutes. The blue line represents the plastic limit of the column and was calculated taking into account the degradation of the yield stress with temperature.
This extension of the thermal load causes only a local crisis: before the column crisis, the heated beams are subjected to instability and they reached enormous displacement that led to their failure.
The collapse becomes more significant for a fire applied on a greater extension of the floor. Table 4 synthesises results found for the Frame A in terms of time of resistance to fire: average, minimum and maximum values are reported for 5 fire extensions. The graph on the left underlines that:
 the thermal load acting on a column and the resulting local failure do not affect the global behaviour of the frame. Which column is invested by the fire does not matter;
 for a thermal load applied on two columns, two different collapse mechanisms (and time of resistance to fire) can be develop, in function of the columns involved;
 a global collapse occurs in every case after about 60-65 minutes for a major fire extension. Which columns are invested by the fire does not matter. Figure 6 shows the worst case scenario for each fire extension (on the top) where the heated elements are in red. The deformed shapes (in the middle of figure) are considered at the end of analysis. This time is 180 minutes if a global collapse does not occur or a shorter time if numerical convergence problems due to large displacements occur. Heated beams have been removed from the deformed shapes of the frame, because they reached enormous displacement that led to their failure. The colours in the figure show which elements are in the elastic range (blue) and which in plastic field (red): for a fire on a column, after 180 minutes plasticity has spread on the Col.25 of the sixth floor and on adjacent beams in floors above the sixth (first deformed shape from left in figure) ; for a fire on two columns, plasticity has spread also on the external columns of the first floor (second deformed shape from left); plasticity is widely spread over the entire central area of the frame in other cases.
Frame B
The thermal action involves Frame B at sixth floor (Figure 7) . At this height, design includes as profiles for columns HEM1000star (Col. Table 5 synthesises results found for Frame B following the above described procedure with the application of an increasing thermal load:
 the load acting on a column or on two subsequent columns do not affect the global behaviour of the frame. Which column is invested by the fire does not matter;
 for a thermal load applied on three columns, two different situations can be occur, in function of the columns involved: if fire is applied also on the external column a global collapse occurs after about 80 minutes; on the other hand, if fire is near the vertical braced system;  the thermal action upon four columns determines a global collapse in each case: if fire affects the central zone of the frame the resistance time is greater than that caused by a lateral fire;  all combinations characterised by the involvement of five subsequent columns lead to a global collapse for similar times (almost 70 minutes). Figure 8 shows the frame behaviour in the worst case scenario with increasing fire extension: on the top, in red heated elements in each fire scenario; on the centre the deformed shape with plasticity spread; on the bottom, the time of first local failure and time of the global collapse. The plasticity spread allows highlighting the role of individual elements within the global behaviour: the outrigger system at 29th floor is able to stress redistribute due a local failure of elements until a certain fire extension; when it becomes ineffective, there is a total failure of the structure.
For the first extension (first deformed shape from left in Figure 8 ), the worst case is when the fire is considered to directly affect Col.15 (1 Heated Column) at sixth floor: after the beam failures, axial force of column (red curve of Figure 12 ) reaches the plastic limit for 640°C after 26 minutes. The crisis of the column is absorbed by the structure through several load paths. The redistribution of the stresses caused to the plasticity of a beam in the outrigger. Despite the exposure to 180 minutes of fire no other damage occurred in the frame.
When fire affects Col.15 and Col.9 (2 Heated Column), the failure of the first column occurs after 28 minutes for a temperature of 680°C.
The exposure to fire leads to a greater spread of plasticity than in previous case in the beams around the outrigger system.
When fire involves Col.15, Col.9 and Col.1 (3 Heated Column), the first collapse happens after 29 minutes for a temperature of 690°C. In this case the outrigger is not able to withstand the increase in stress due to local failures: the vertical braced system allows isolating the collapse in one side of the structure.
For a major fire extension (4 Heated Column and 5 Heated Column), the collapse propagates also on the rest of the frame.
The comparison of the response to fire of the outrigger system in each case is shown in Figure 9 .
In Case A an alternative load path without negative consequences is developed; in Case B minimal damage spread diffusion occurs; the increasing spread of plastic areas in Case C does not cause the loss of effectiveness of the system; in Case D and Case E, the extension of the plastic area is so wide that the outrigger no longer contributes to the strength of the structure and it is no longer effective in redistributing the stresses. In this case a progression of the failures occurs, which ultimately cause the collapse of the frame. 
Analysis on full model
If the analyses of the substructures are able to evidence the fundamental behaviours of the structures under fire, the quantitative assessment of the building performances requires complete models of the structural system. In this case, a good parameter to follow the global behaviour of the building is the displacement on the top floor. Figure 10 shows the evolution of the collapse for Fire Scenario 1. In this case, structural changes determine a good improvement delaying the collapse that begins about 15 minutes later and covers a reduced area. During the exposure to fire, the lower percentage of involved area is still evident (Table 6 ). Figure 11 refers to Fire Scenario 2: here collapse starts for the same fire exposure, but it is clear the reduction of the propagation of the crisis. Modern trends in building design and assessment are rapidly driving engineers toward the application of Probabilistic Performance-Based Engineering (PPBE) approaches (Barbato et al., 2014) . PPBE allows designers to consistently take into account all the aspects related to the serviceability and safety of both existing and new structures without enforcing any limitation to the available design solutions and taking into account for the impact of both aleatory and epistemic uncertainty related to the whole life-cycle of the structures. PPBE has been mainly applied in earthquake engineering. Several frameworks have been proposed for PBE in Earthquake engineering, and as declared in Krawinkler (1999) "they differ in details but not in concepts". Extensions to other design situations, like blast (Hamburger and Whittaker 2003; Crosti et al., 2012) , wind (Petrini and Ciampoli, 2011) , tsunami (Riggs et al., 2008) scenarios, have been successively proposed. As a design approach, Performance-based design (PBD) has been extensively introduced in fire engineering standards in the last years (Buchanan, 1994; Hadjisophocleous et al., 1998; Beyler et al., 2007) and many research studies on this topic have been produced. However the studies generally do not treat the uncertainties related to both capacity and demand parameters with the classical and well established methods that are used in other structural engineering fields (earthquake, wind, etc.) . This is mainly due to the fact that fires are very specific treats: their intensity and extension are strictly related to the particular configuration of the flammable material, potential fire ignition sources and compartments configuration that are in place in the specific building. In this context, heuristic methods are actually preferable to the pure probabilistic approaches, being the first more reliable when the designer must deal with accidental actions and/or structures with raw statistical data. On the contrary the probabilistic approach is usually feasible in case of performances investigation of structural configurations and actions whose can be statistically characterised by the avail of databases with a satisfying amount of data. Recently, researchers started working in the direction of identifying and collecting the necessary statistical data for defining reliable probabilistic distribution of the uncertain capacity and demand parameters in fire safety engineering problems (Lange et al., 2014) , meaning that PPBE approaches will be fully available in the near future also for fire engineering forensic investigations. This circumstance further enforces the point stressed in this paper regarding the importance of that advanced analysis methods in forensic evaluations.
Conclusions
The susceptibility of high-rise buildings to fire-induced progressive collapse is a critical aspect of the design of this kind of structures. Specific difficulties related to the implementation of other fire safety measures for high-rise buildings (e.g. amount of needed water for fire suppression and of the required egress time) highlight the importance of correct design solutions for structural robustness under fires. Additional emphasis to this aspect is given from the potential disastrous involvements of the surrounding environment in tall buildings progressive collapse. Prescriptive design approaches are not capable to address this structural requirement, which need to be inserted in the modern context of Performance-Based Engineering. In the paper, these considerations are discussed with direct reference to the forensic context: it is outlined that advanced numerical Finite Element (FE) analyses are the main tool to design the robustness of tall buildings under fire and to assess the occurred fire scenarios in a damage-observation-based back analysis of an occurred event. The procedure and the analyses carried out for robustness assessment of a case-study high-rise building are presented and the criticisms of the various phases are discussed:
(i) analyses must be conducted on FE models of increasing complexity, starting from simplified-partial models of the building (in order to investigate fundamental qualitative behaviours of structural members), and arriving to complete FE models of the building for quantitative global assessment of the progressive collapse susceptibility;
(ii) the sub-structures of the structural system (e.g. outriggers) that are critical for robustness performances need to be individuated by the simplified models, paying particular attention to the effect of the distortion of the hot members to the far-fire parts of the building;
(iii) then the robustness of the building under fire must be defined in a performancebased design context, the performances must be quantified by global building models in terms of recognised performance indicators (e.g. elapsed time for progressive collapse) and by comparing them with the standards requirements under different fire scenarios.
The developed analyses show that, for the examined case-study building, the yielding of steel members in the outrigger system during fire plays a primary role in progressive collapse occurrence, also if the outrigger is located in a "cold" zone of the structural system. In addition it can be concluded that an asymmetric yielding of the outrigger due to the thermal buckling of bottom fire-stressed columns, causes a sideway type collapse of the building, which results in a disastrous collapse scenario in terms of the building surroundings' involvement.
